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PATENT EXHAUSTION FOR THE
EXHAUSTED DEFENDANT:
SHOULD PARTIES BE ABLE TO
CONTRACT AROUND EXHAUSTION IN
SETTLING PATENT LITIGATION?
Samuel F. Ernstt
Abstract
The first sale doctrine provides that when a patent holder unconditionally
authorizes another party to sell a patented item, the patent holder's right to
exclude with respect to the patented item is "exhausted. " The licensee can
then sell the patented item to a third party-a downstream purchaser-and the
patent holder will not be able to sue the third party for patent infringement
based on the resale or other use of that item. A principal animating policy
behind the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent patent holders from receiving
overcompensation for their patented inventions by, for example, aggregating
royalties along multiple points in the production and distribution chain.
Patent holders settling infringement litigation often seek to draft a license
agreement that precludes application of the exhaustion doctrine, so that they
may continue to pursue licensed products downstream. Such provisions are
likely ineffective if drafted as post-sale restrictions on what downstream
purchasers may do with their patented products. However, it is possible to
contract around exhaustion by limiting the scope of the authorized sale (a
"pre-sale restriction') or through other clever licensing devices that are
described in this paper.
But should such provisions be enforceable? The prevailing view in the
academic literature argues from a law and economics perspective that it is
economically efficient to allow patent holders to license their patents at
multiple points along the production chain, and that the free market will curb
patent holders' ability to receive double-recovery.
This article counters the law and economics literature to argue that such
provisions should not be enforced if they are brokered as part of a litigation
f Assistant Professor of Law, Fowler School of Law, Chapman University. I thank my colleagues at
the Fowler School of Law, and in particular Deepa Badrinarayana, Kenneth A. Stahl, Rita Bamett-Rose, and
David Gibbs, for their comments on this paper. I also thank my colleagues who commented on an abstract of
this paper at the Eleventh Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Santa Clara
University School of Law and at the Patent Conference 4 at the University of San Diego School of Law.
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settlement. The litigation settlement context distorts the economic efficiencies
allegedly created by contracting around exhaustion and can prevent free
market checks on double-recovery. The expense and risk of litigation, the
threat of injunctions, and the pressure to settle can weigh heavily on the patent
infringement defendant. The license fee that is negotiated may not be
sufficiently discounted to account for the reservation of downstream rights
preserved by the patent holder. This is particularly true in light of research in
cognitive psychology indicating that litigants do not engage in economically
rational behavior in making settlement decisions. Defendants will likely favor
a lower settlement price in exchange for a provision contracting around
exhaustion, and take the risk that litigation against downstream customers will
be defeated or that indemnification can be avoided
If there is a clear rule against contracting around exhaustion, the parties
will set the license fee at a rate that gives the patent holder full compensation
up front, and the defendant can simply pass along this extra cost to
downstream purchasers. This efficiently avoids the costs of additional
litigation against downstream purchasers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The exhaustion doctrine generally provides that when a patent holder
authorizes another party to sell a patented item, either through a license or a
covenant not to sue, the patent holder's right to exclude with respect to the
patented item is exhausted.' The licensee can then sell the patented item to a
third party-such as a distributor or manufacturer-and the patent holder will
not be able to sue the third party for patent infringement based on the resale or
other use of that item.2
This Article addresses a situation that arises frequently when parties agree
to settle a hard-fought, expensive patent litigation lawsuit. The parties agree
on the biggest issue standing in the way of a settlement, the amount of money
the accused infringer must pay the patent holder. In exchange for this sum, the
plaintiff agrees to license its patents to the defendant, or to give defendant a
covenant not to sue on the patents. But as the settlement papers are being
drafted, the plaintiff is afflicted with a growing concern. What if plaintiff
wants to enforce its patents against defendant's downstream customers, such as
manufacturers who distribute the licensed feature in a larger product? The
courts will likely view the settlement license as exhausting plaintiffs patent
rights in the accused products, preventing such further enforcement of the
patents. To attempt to avoid such an outcome, the plaintiff might demand that
the settlement license include a provision that somehow avoids exhaustion of
the plaintiff's patent rights in the accused products, and makes clear that the
plaintiff retains the right to enforce its patents downstream. The defendant
may readily agree to such a provision for various reasons, including the need
finally to staunch the blood flow of litigation expenses, to remove the cloud of
uncertainty over defendant's business caused by the litigation, and to ensure
that the settlement amount does not increase due to the lack of such a
provision.
Can such a provision be drafted? Under current law, it is unlikely that a
"post-sale restriction" will be effective to avoid exhaustion. In other words,
once there has been an authorized first sale, a clause purporting to restrict
downstream purchasers' rights in the product will not preserve an infringement
remedy for the patent holder.
This is the somewhat ambiguous holding of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
1. See TIMOTHY B. DYK & SAMUEL F. ERNST, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 86:57 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011) (explaining the elements of patent exhaustion).
2. Id See also Bloomer v. McQucwan, 55 U.S. (I How.) 539, 549 (1852) (noting that exhaustion also
occurs in the simpler situation where the patent holder itself unconditionally sells its patented product).
3. For convenience I will occasionally call the patent holder "the plaintiff" and the accused infringer
"the defendant," although in a declaratory judgment suit these roles would obviously be reversed.
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Electronics, Inc.4  In that case, LGE granted Intel a license to its patents,
unconditionally authorizing Intel to make, use, or sell microprocessors that,
when used, would practice LGE's method claims.5  Intel made the
microprocessors and then sold them to Quanta, who manufactured computers
using the Intel parts in combination with other parts.6 The Supreme Court held
that LGE could not sue Quanta for patent infringement because when it
authorized Intel to sell the patented microprocessors, its patent rights with
respect to those particular microprocessors were exhausted.
The Court made this holding despite the fact that the LGE-Intel
agreement specifically provided that no license was granted to any third party
to practice LGE's patents by combining them with non-Intel parts. Nor was
exhaustion precluded by the fact that the parties had a separate agreement
requiring Intel to notify customers that LGE had not licensed Intel's customers
to practice its patents.9 Because the license agreement unconditionally granted
Intel a right to sell the microprocessors, LGE's patent rights in the
microprocessors were exhausted, and Quanta did not need a license from LGE
to use the microprocessors. 0
Commentators and courts have noted that the scope of the Court's
holding on this issue is technically ambiguous." On the one hand, the holding
may be very narrow; that the particular contract language at issue was
insufficient to contract around exhaustion, but that, if properly drafted, the
patent holder could impose a post-sale restriction on downstream purchasers.
On the other hand, the Court may have made a holding dismissing the
effectiveness of post-sale restrictions altogether, overruling Federal Circuit
precedent that post-sale restrictions can defeat patent exhaustion. Under this
reading, once there is an authorized first sale, the patent holder has no power to
impose any sort of restriction whatsoever on downstream purchasers' use of
the product. But in the years since the Quanta decision, the lower courts have
generally adopted the broader reading of Quanta.12 As one district court has
phrased it, "[lt]he Supreme Court's broad statement of the law of patent
exhaustion simply cannot be squared with the position that the Quanta holding
4. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636-37 (2008).
5. Id. at 624.
6. Id. at 624.
7. Id. at 638.
8. Id. at 623, 637.
9. Id at 636.
10. Id. at 636-37. The Court made two other major holdings in Quanta to strengthen the defense of
patent exhaustion that are not the primary focus of this Article:
First, the Court reversed Federal Circuit precedent by holding that method claims can be exhausted
by the sale of an apparatus that, when used as intended, practices the method claims. Id. at 628.
Second, the Court held that patent exhaustion applies to a product that "substantially embodies" the
method claims, even though it does not embody each and every limitation of the patent claim. The
microprocessors would only infringe if they were attached to standard memory components and a bus, but
because this was the only "reasonable and intended use" of the microprocessors, they substantially embodied
the patented invention to trigger exhaustion. Id. at 631-33.
I1. See infra Section II.B.
12. See infra Section II.B.
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is limited to its specific facts."
In any event, a defendant settling a lawsuit must assume that the Supreme
Court's holding broadly does away with effective post-sale restrictions because
that is what the plaintiff will assume. Many patent holders are reluctant to
grant a settlement license that could preclude them from pursuing infringement
litigation against downstream purchasers of patented products (particularly
non-practicing entities, who make a business out of licensing and suing on
their patents). Such patent holders will not take the risk that the Supreme
Court's holding only encompasses the particular language of the post-sale
restriction at issue in Quanta. They may not settle the litigation unless there is
a way to draft a contract provision unequivocally preserving their right to sue
downstream purchasers. Defendants who hope to settle litigation are therefore
often tasked with inventing a licensing provision that the plaintiff will not view
as a post-sale restriction; a licensing provision that the defendant can
persuasively convince the plaintiff will not later be deemed by a court as
ineffective to prevent exhaustion of the patent rights.
This Article catalogues potential licensing solutions that would preserve
the ability of the patent holder to sue downstream purchasers and that are not
post-sale restrictions, and assesses the likelihood that each solution would be
effective under a broad ban on post-sale restrictions. In particular, I assess to
what extent the solutions would be acceptable to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. 14
But all of this begs the question: should parties be entitled to contract
around exhaustion in settling patent litigation? This Article argues that such
clauses should not be enforceable, and that courts should resolve the ambiguity
inherent in the Quanta opinion in favor of a hard rule preventing parties from
contracting around exhaustion, whether framed as post-sale or pre-sale
restrictions.
The primary, animating policy behind the exhaustion doctrine is to
prevent patent holders from obtaining overcompensation (often called "double-
recovery") for their patented inventions. Once a patent holder has received full
compensation for the use of its patented invention in a particular product, it
should not be able to recover additional royalties from downstream purchasers.
Some commentators have argued that market forces naturally check
patent holders from achieving overcompensation by aggregating royalties
along multiple levels of the production chain. But these market forces are
often absent in the context of a litigation settlement. And research in cognitive
psychology suggests that defendants do not act rationally in settling
litigation.' 6  The result in this context is that accused infringers may not
13. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585-86 (E.D. Ky.
2009).
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR Licensing: Contracting
Around 'First Sale' in Multilevel Production Settings, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1149, 1157-67 (2011)
(discussing how market forces may check overcompensation).
16. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 114-
120 (1996).
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demand that any settlement price be sufficiently lowered to account for the
patent holder's reservation of rights against downstream purchasers.' 7
A categorical rule preventing parties from contracting around exhaustion
allows the parties to set the settlement license fee at a rate that gives the patent
holder full compensation up front, efficiently avoiding the costs of additional
litigation against downstream purchasers.
Such a rule also finds support in the public policy against restraints on
alienation.' When a patent holder releases its claim against a product and
licenses its sale, allowing the patent holder to continue to pursue the product
downstream offends downstream purchasers' reasonable expectations in the
ownership of their private property.
Such a rule is further supported by judicial efficiency.' 9  Although the
refusal to recognize provisions purporting to contract around exhaustion may
frustrate the settlement of particular lawsuits and require those cases to go to
trial, allowing parties to contract around exhaustion multiplies litigation. This
is evidenced by the rise in recent years of "customer suits," where patent
holders pursue countless resellers or even end users of accused products, rather
than or in addition to the manufacturers of the accused products.20 These
customer lawsuits result in numerous judicial inefficiencies. Because the
accused infringers did not make the accused technology, such cases are
characterized by extensive third party discovery, confidentiality disputes,
motions practice, and other burdens.
Finally, one must consider the effect of the exhaustion doctrine on
innovation. Although some commentators have made the assertion that a
strong exhaustion doctrine weakens patents, and therefore deters the incentive
to innovate,22 there has been no empirical analysis to prove this hypothesis.
Furthermore, patent policy encourages innovation not only through the direct
encouragement of innovation. Under the contract theory of patent policy, the
law also grants an exclusionary right to encourage disclosure of technical
information and thereby facilitate the development of further advances by the
public. The exclusionary right must be carefully calibrated, however:
sufficiently vigorous to encourage disclosure but not so vigorous as to inhibit
the further advances patent policy also seeks to facilitate. Before allowing
parties to contract around exhaustion, we must consider the extent to which the
exhaustion doctrine allows breathing room for such downstream innovation by
imposing a hard rule against running servitudes.
17. See infra Section Ill.A.
18. See infra Section IlI.B.
19. See infra Section III.C.
20. See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law's Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1605, 1606-15 (2013) (discussing the rise of "customer suits" brought by non-practicing patent assertion
entities, which result in outcomes reflecting the cost of defense, rather than the value of the patents).
21. Infra Section Ill.D.
22. Infra Section Ill.D.
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II. LEGAL OVERVIEW
A. The Birth, Death, and Rebirth of the Post-Sale Restriction
The Patent Act provides that "[e]very patent shall contain ... a grant to
the patentee ... of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States .... "2 3 This is a
critical right granted to the patentee, defining "the fundamental nature of
patents as property rights granting the owner the right to exclude." 24
And yet, through the development of over 160 years of common law, the
courts have established that the right to exclude can be relinquished--or
exhausted-when a patent holder sells or authorizes the sale of a patented item.
In the foundational case of Bloomer v. McQuewan, the Supreme Court
declared that when a patent holder sells its patented machine to a purchaser
"for the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life . . . [a]nd when the
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits
of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection
of the act of Congress." 25 In other words, the patent holder no longer has the
right to sue the purchaser for patent infringement.
In subsequent years, the cases recognized that in certain circumstances
the patent holder could contract around exhaustion by imposing limitations in
the license on the use that the purchaser could make of the patented product.
In Henr v. A.B. Dick Co., the Court recognized the validity of post-sale
restrictions. The patent holder, A.B. Dick Co., sold its patented mimeograph
machine and granted purchasers a license to use the machine.27 However, the
license included the following post-sale restriction: "This machine is sold by
the A. B. Dick Company with the license restriction that it may be used only
with the stencil pa er, ink, and other supplies made by A. B. Dick Company,
Chicago, U. S. A." 8 The defendant Henry sold his own ink to a purchaser of
the machine "with knowledge of the said license agreement, and with the
expectation that it would be used in connection with said mimeograph."29 A.B.
Dick contended that it could sue Henry for indirect infringement of its patent
because Henry thereby induced the purchaser of the machine to engage in an
unauthorized use constituting patent infringement. 30
The Court held that A.B. Dick had a remedy against Henry for indirect
patent infringement. The Court acknowledged the cases holding that "[a]n
absolute and unconditional sale operates to pass the patented thing outside the
boundaries of the patent, because such a sale implies that the patentee consents
23. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).
24. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1]42, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
25. Bloomer v. McQucwan, 55 U.S. (I How.) 539, 549 (1852).
26. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1912).
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Id. at l -12.
30. Id. at 16.
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that the purchaser may use the machine so long as its identity is preserved."
However, the Court distinguished those cases on the basis that they did not
involve a contractual limitation on the right to use the patented inventions.
The Court held that "if the right of use be confined by specific restriction, the
use not permitted is necessarily reserved to the patentee. If that reserved
control of use of the machine be violated, the patent is thereby invaded." 32
Hence was born the post-sale restriction.
Five years later, the Court overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., holding that
post-sale restrictions are ineffective to prevent exhaustion. In Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., Motion Picture Patents Co. held a
patent on film projectors and granted a license to a third party to manufacture
and sell the patented projectors. 33 The license agreement contained a post-sale
restriction very similar to the one at issue in Henry, providing that the patented
projectors could only be used to display films that were claimed by another of
the plaintiffs patents.34 The machines were to be sold, "under the restriction
and condition that such exhibiting or projecting machine shall be used solely
for exhibiting or projecting motion pictures containing the inventions of
",35reissued letters patent No. 12,192. When Universal Film supplied to a
purchaser of the patented projector films that were not authorized for use on
the machine, Motion Picture Patents Co. sued Universal Film for
infringement.36
The Court held that the post-sale restriction was invalid and did not
prevent the exhaustion of Motion Picture Patents Co.'s rights in the machine-
and that there was therefore no cause of action for patent infringement. 37 The
Court reasoned that patent holders must be checked in their attempts to impose
license restrictions on the use of their patented products in order to exclude the
use of other products not covered by their patents: "the scope of the grant
which may be made to an inventor in a patent, pursuant to the [patent] statute,
must be limited to the invention described in the claims of his patent." 38 The
Court held that "the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale,
the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law
and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put
upon it."39
The Court grounded its holding in two critical policy considerations that
are at the heart of the exhaustion doctrine.
First, a patent holder should not be overcompensated for a license to its
intellectual property above the value of the invention on the free market.
Allowing a patent holder to exercise patent rights in products for which it has
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1917).
34. Id at 506.
35. Id
36. Id at 508.
37. Id. at 519.
38. Id.at5ll.
39. Id at 516.
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already received royalties would result in such overcompensation, which is
also called "double recovery." The Motion Picture Patents Court reasoned,
"the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes
for the owners of patents, but is 'to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts. "40 A right to exclude that is exhausted once exercised:
is all that the statute provides shall be given to [the inventor] and it
is all that he should receive, for it is the fair as well as the statutory
measure of his reward for his contribution to the public stock of
knowledge. If his discovery is an important one, his reward under
such a construction of the law will be large, as experience has
abundantly proved; and if it be unimportant, he should not be
permitted by legal devices to impose an unjust charge upon the
public in return for the use of it. 41
In various decisions throughout the years the Court relied on this policy against
double recovery to justify the exhaustion doctrine.42
The exhaustion doctrine is also grounded in the policy against restraints
on alienation of chattels. Once a patent holder authorizes the sale of an article,
downstream purchasers of the item have a reasonable expectation that they
may use the item free of restrictions from previous owners. The Motion
Picture Patents court explained that the exhaustion doctrine seeks to avoid a
situation where a patent holder can:
send its machines forth into the channels of trade of the country
subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be imposed
thereafter at the discretion of such patent owner. The patent law
furnishes no warrant for such a practice, and the cost,
inconvenience, and annoyance to the public which the opposite
conclusion would occasion forbid it.43
The Supreme Court recently relied. on this polic against restraints on
alienation to justify the copyright exhaustion doctrine.
Grounded in these policy justifications, the Motion Picture Patents case
established that provisions purporting to place a post-sale restriction on
downstream purchasers' rights in a patented product were ineffective to defeat
patent exhaustion.
Despite these policies, in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., the Court recognized that a "pre-sale restriction" on the scope of
an authorized sale could defeat patent exhaustion.45 In that case the plaintiff
40. Id. at 511 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
41. Id. at 513.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) ("Our decisions have
uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when
the patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once that
purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.");
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) ("But, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the
consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.").
43. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
44. Kirtsacng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
45. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 180-181 (1938).
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held patents on vacuum tube amplifiers that could be used with amateur radio
sets or in motion picture houses. The plaintiff licensed a third party to make
and sell the patented equipment, but the third party's license "was expressly
confined to the right to manufacture and sell the patented amplifiers for radio
amateur reception, radio experimental reception, and home broadcast. It had
no right to sell the amplifiers for use in theaters as a part of talking picture
equipment." 47 Nonetheless, the third party manufactured the equipment and
sold it to the defendant for use in movie houses, even though the defendant
"had actual knowledge that the latter had no license to make such a sale.""8
The Court held that the plaintiff could sue for patent infringement based
on the defendant's use of the patented amplifiers in movie houses. 9 The Court
reasoned that there was no authorized sale in this case because "[t]he patent
owner did not sell to petitioner the amplifiers in question or authorize the
Transformer Company to sell them or any amplifiers for use in theaters or any
other commercial use."50  In other words, the first requirement of patent
exhaustion was not met-this was not an "authorized sale-" "[t]he
Transformer Company could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was
not authorized to sell."51
Accordingly, the Court in General Talking Pictures drew an implicit
distinction between (1) a license that attempts to impose post-sale restrictions
on the use of patented items after a fully authorized sale; and (2) a license that
limits the scope of the authorized sale, authorizing sale for only particular uses
(we will call this a "pre-sale restriction"). Post-sale restrictions are ineffective
to prevent patent exhaustion because the patented article has already passed out
of the patent monopoly. According to General Talking Pictures, however, pre-
sale restrictions on the scope of authorization can prevent exhaustion because
to the extent the sale violates the pre-sale restriction, there is no authorized first
52
sale. The first element of patent exhaustion is not established.
However, in the case of Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,53 the Federal
Circuit disregarded this distinction. The Court expanded the doctrine of
General Talking Pictures to allow patent holders to place restrictions on the
use of sold products without regard to whether the restrictions were structured
as post-sale or pre-sale restrictions.54
In that case the plaintiff Mallinckrodt sold its patented aerosol mist
delivery device to hospitals.55  Mallinckrodt had no agreement with the
hospitals regarding a license to its patents, save that it stamped on its product
the legend "Single Use Only," and included a package insert with its product
46. Id at 176, 179.
47. Id. at 179-80.
48. Id at 180.
49. Id at 182-83.
50. Id at 180.
51. Id. at 181.
52. Id at 180.
53. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54. Id at 702.
55. Id at 701-02.
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"instruct[ing] that the entire contaminated apparatus be disposed of in
accordance with procedures for the disposal of biohazardous waste."56  The
hospitals did not dispose of the devices, however.57 Instead, the hospitals sent
the devices to the defendant Medipart, who refurbished them, and returned
them to the hospitals for additional use.58  Mallinckrodt sued Medipart for
patent infringement and indirect patent infringement, and on appeal the Federal
Circuit held that Mallinckrodt's patent rights were not exhausted.
The Mallinckrodt court did not analyze whether the single use stamp and
disposal instructions were a pre-sale restriction or an ineffective post-sale
restriction after an authorized sale. The court dismissed as "formalistic lined
drawing"60 the assertion that "the viability of a restriction should depend on
how the transaction is structured."61 In fact, there can be little doubt that what
Mallinckrodt attempted to achieve with its stamp and product insert was an
invalid post-sale restriction after making an unconditional sale of its patented
product. Nonetheless, the court asserted-without analyzing the details of the
transaction-that Mallinckrodt's scheme was a valid condition on sale.62
For many years thereafter, parties settling patent litigation could easily
contract around patent exhaustion in order to facilitate the settlement. A
provision stating that no implied license was granted to third parties would
likely suffice. A provision stating that the patent holder's rights in the product
were not exhausted with respect to downstream purchasers would likely
suffice. Even a "single use only" stamp on the products would apparently
suffice.
B. Under Current Law, Post-Sale Restrictions are Likely Ineffective
to Prevent Exhaustion
The Supreme Court's opinion in Quanta likely abrogated the viability of
post-sale restrictions to avoid patent exhaustion.
In the case below, LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., the
Federal Circuit considered whether LGE's patent rights were exhausted in
microprocessors that it granted Intel the unconditional right to manufacture and
sell. Intel and LGE's license agreement unconditionally granted Intel the
right to "make, use, [or] sell" LGE's patented microprocessors.65 But it also
had a provision disclaiming that it granted a license to downstream purchasers
56. Id at 702.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id. at 709.
60. Id. at 705.
61. Id (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977)).
62. Id. at 709.
63. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) ("The authorized sale of an
article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder
from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.").
64. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev d sub nom.
Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
65. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636.
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of the microprocessors allowing them to combine the microprocessors with
66non-Intel parts and resell them. And by a separate agreement, Intel was
required to notify purchasers that they were not authorized to combine them
with non-Intel parts for resale.67 Intel made the patented processors and sold
them to Quanta, which then practiced LGE's patent claims by inserting the
devices into computers (their only intended use) for resale to customers.
The Federal Circuit decided that LGE's patent rights in the
microprocessors were not exhausted, such that LGE could sue Quanta for
infringement.69 The court held that the language in the LGE-Intel license
disclaiming an implied license to third 7parties placed a condition on Quanta's
purchase of those products from Intel. The court buttressed this conclusion
with the fact that Intel was required to notify customers that they had no
license to combine the products into their computers.7' "Although Intel was
free to sell its microprocessors and chipsets, those sales were conditional, and
Intel's customers were expressly prohibited from infringing LGE's
combination patents."72
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that LGE unconditionally
authorized the sales Intel made, despite the contract's language disclaiming an
implied license to downstream purchasers. The Court reasoned that although
the contract purported to place restrictions on what Intel's customers could do,
[n]othing in the License Agreement restricts Intel's right to sell its
microprocessors and chip sets to purchasers who intend to combine them with
non-Intel parts. It broadly permits Intel to "make, use, [or] sell" products free
of LGE's patent claims.74
Once this language unconditionally granted Intel the right to sell the
products downstream, LGE's patent rights were exhausted, and it did not
matter if there was other language in the contract stating that customers did not
have an implied license.
The Court dispensed with the language disclaiming the implied license in
a peculiar way, leaving open the question of whether the Court's holding
broadly did away with the effectiveness of post-sale restrictions, or only turned
on the particular language of the contract. The Court held:
LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed
any license to third parties to practice the patents by combining
licensed products with other components. But the question whether
third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta
asserts its right to practice the patents based not on implied license
but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel's own license
66. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
67. Id.
68. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 624.
69. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Quanta. 553 U.S. at 635-37.
7. Id. at 636.
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to sell products practicing the LGE patents.75
This holding is ambiguous in the following way:
(1) It could be that the post-sale restriction was ineffective simply
because it was drafted in the language of a disclaimer of implied license to
third parties, separate from the unconditional grant to Intel of the right to sell.
If that is the case, then exhaustion could be contracted around effectively by
redrafting the contract such that a post-sale restriction on use (rather than a
disclaimer of implied license) is directly appended to and limits the scope of
the authorized sale.
(2) On the other hand, the Court may have broadly held that post sale
restrictions are ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion, regardless of how they
are drafted.
In the wake of Quanta, many scholars pointed out that the holding was
ambiguous in this respect.76 Some commentators have argued that the holdin
should be interpreted narrowly to continue to allow for post-sale restrictions.
Others have argued that the decision is better interpreted as a broader decree
that post-sale restrictions are ineffective to prevent patent exhaustion. 78
Judicial opinions from the lower courts, issued in the wake of Quanta,
suggest that the courts may adopt the broader reading-that Quanta eliminated
the effectiveness of post-sale restrictions to defeat patent exhaustion.79
In TransCore, LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp., the
Federal Circuit addressed the issue tangentially. In that case, the plaintiff
TransCore had entered into a settlement agreement with third party Mark IV
75. Id. at 637 (internal citations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23
HARV. JL. & TECH. 483, 485-86 (2010) ("Over time, the Supreme Court has addressed these problems
obliquely, if at all . . . . In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court revisited the
exhaustion doctrine .... Justice Thomas did not address many of the parties' and amici's arguments regarding
the scope of a patent owner's right to exclude others .... The response to the Quanta ruling has been mixed.
Lower courts, scholars, and owners or users of patented technology have tried to read the tea leaves in Quanta
to guide them in close case within previously unexplored areas of patent law .... ); Jason McCammon, The
Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing Views of Patent Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785, 790-96 (2009) ("The issue the
Court did not address is Quanta is what exactly constitutes an authorized sale . This is particularly
problematic .... [T]he Court did not explain how it reached a different factual conclusion than the lower court
about whether the sale was restricted . . . . As a result, the Court's holding appears consistent with at least two
potentially contradictory approaches to patent exhaustion and conditional sales . . . . Separate analyses of these
competing approaches illustrate the ambiguity that confuses application of Quanta to conditional sales.").
77. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar, supra note 15, at 1150 ("My decidedly non-legal reading of the Supreme
Court's decision in Quanta asserts that the Court did not rule out such contractual flexibility for patents.");
William LaFuze et al., The Conditional Sale Doctrine in a Post-Quanta World and its Implications on Modern
Licensing Agreements, II J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 295, 315-16 (2011) ("[T]hc proper
interpretation [of Quanta] is the one that leaves the scope of the conditional sale doctrine intact ....
[C]onditional sales and restricted licenses were not outlawed by Quanta. Both are still viable options . .. . ").
78. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting
Options off the Table?, 315-16 (Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 366, 2008) (explaining the different
possible readings of the Court's Quanta decision as it relates to patent licensing agreements).
79. Tesscra, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 646 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Static Control Components,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009); Transcore, LP v. Elec. Transaction
Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
80. Transcore, LP v. Elce. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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that included an unconditional covenant not to sue for future infringement. 8'
The holding of the case is that an unconditional covenant not to sue is no
different from an affirmative license to practice the patents; both trigger patent
82
exhaustion. Because there was no provision in the contract attempting to
impose a post-sale restriction on the rights of downstream purchasers, the issue
of whether such post-sale restrictions are valid was not raised. However,
TransCore sought to rely on parol evidence to the contract purportedly
showing "the parties' intent not to provide downstream rights to Mark IV's
customers . .. .. The Federal Circuit held that "[t]he district court's decision
to exclude TransCore's parol evidence has not affected any substantial right of
TransCore."84 This was because "[t]he only issue relevant to patent exhaustion
is whether Mark IV's sales were authorized, not whether TransCore and Mark
IV intended, expressly or impliedly, for the covenant to extend to Mark IV's
customers."85 This would appear to indicate that an express provision in the
contract that the covenant not extend to downstream purchasers would not
have prevented exhaustion any more than parol evidence could have.
And in Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,
the district court explicitly held that a post-sale restriction of the kind approved
in Mallinckrodt was ineffective to prevent exhaustion.86 In Static Control,
Lexmark sold its patented printer cartridges with a "single use" restriction like
the single use restriction at issue in Mallinckrodt.87 In selling its printer
cartridges to customers, Lexmark printed a notice on its packaging warning
customers that the "cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a restriction
that it may be used only once."8  Lexmark accused Static Control of infringing
on its patents by refurbishing spent cartridges for additional uses, in violation
of the single-use restriction.89 The court acknowledged that "the Supreme
Court did not expressly overrule Mallinckrodt in its Quanta opinion."9 The
court noted that there was a debate in the academic literature as to whether the
Supreme Court had broadly rejected post-sale restrictions as sufficient to
defeat exhaustion, or if "the Quanta holding is limited to the very specific
facts, and the very specific license agreement, that confronted the Court." 91
The court decided "that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio. The
Supreme Court's broad statement of the law of patent exhaustion simply
cannot be squared with the position that the Quanta holding is limited to its
specific facts." 92
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit held in Tessera, Inc. v. International
81. Id at 1276.
82. Id at 1276-77.
83. Id. at 1277.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
87. Id at 577.
88. Id. at 577 n.3.
89. Id. at 577.
90. Id. at 585.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 585-86.
458 [Vol. 2014
PATENT EXHAUSTION
Trade Commission that a licensee's sale of a licensed product did not become
unauthorized because of the licensee's subsequent failure to pay the agreed
royalty to the patent holder.93 In so ruling, the court reasoned, "[t]hat absurd
result would cast a cloud of uncertainty over every sale, and every product in
the possession of a customer of the licensee, and would be wholly inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose of patent exhaustion-to prohibit post sale
restrictions on the use of a patented article.,94
In light of these lower court opinions, the correct interpretation of Quanta
is likely that post-sale restrictions are per se ineffective to avoid patent
exhaustion. 95
III. CONTRACTING AROUND EXHAUSTION POST-QUANTA
For the practitioner attempting to broker a patent license agreement to
settle a lawsuit, the debate over how to resolve the ambiguity regarding post-
sale restrictions in Quanta does not matter. Parties settling litigation must
assume that post-sale restrictions are invalid, particularly in light of the broad
reading of Quanta on this point by the lower courts. 96 Patent holders are often
very reluctant to sign settlement agreements granting defendants a license or
covenant not to sue if there is a risk that they will forfeit the ability to pursue
downstream customers for patent infringement. 97 Several commentators have
observed how an unintended consequence of Quanta is that it can frustrate the
brokering of patent licenses. 98
Accordingly, the pertinent question facing practitioners is not how broad
the Quanta holding was on this issue. The pertinent question is, if one
assumes that Quanta broadly swept away the effectiveness of post-sale
restrictions on the use of a patented product, what types of licensing provisions
could effectively prevent exhaustion? In this section, I assess the viability of
seven potential licensing solutions that may not be viewed as impermissible
post-sale restrictions.
93. Tesscra, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
94. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bloomer v. McQucwan, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 539, 549 (1852)).
95. The Supreme Court most recently addressed the exhaustion doctrine in Bowman v. Monsanto Co.,
133 S.Ct. 1761 (2013), holding that the authorized sale of a patented seed did not exhaust Monsanto's patent
rights in replications of the seeds created by the defendant. Bowman, 133 S.Ct. at 1766. The Bowman case
deals specifically with the application of the exhaustion doctrine to self-replicating technology. Id. at 1769.
The case does not deal with the licensing issues that are the focus of this article and is therefore not treated
extensively here.
96. Tessera, Inc., 646 F.3d at 1357; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009); Transcore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
97. Transcore, 563 F.3d at 1277.
98. See, e.g., David W. Bechler, Maximizing Your Patent Strategy in a Changing World, in PATENT
LAW 2009: Top LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 39, 39-40 (Aspatore
2008) ("You can imagine the difficulty in trying to convince a component supplier to somehow give up their
authority to sell their licensed component downstream."); Kieff, supra note 78, at 316 (noting that the opinion
"may greatly frustrate the ability of commercial parties to strike deals over patents").
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A. Pre-Sale Restrictions
1. Pre-Sale Restriction on the Identity ofDownstream Purchasers
One solution would be to restrict the scope of the licensee's right to sell
to particular customers. Rather than unconditionally granting the licensee the
right to sell patented components, the license could provide that the "licensee
may only sell patented components to parties who first obtain a license to the
patents from the license holder." This would preserve the ability of the patent
holder to pursue separately particular downstream purchasers with licensing
demands or litigation.
A restriction similar to this one was identified by Andrew T. Dufresne in
The Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects of
the Supreme Court's Quanta Decision. According to Dr. Dufresne,
"Qualcomm uses a two-tiered licensing format in which licensed chipmakers
receive rights to make and sell chips using licensed technology but may only
sell such chips to buyers separately licensed by Qualcomm."loo The
Qualcomm licenses identify a list of authorized chip purchasers, and explicitly
limit the grant of the licensee's right to sell licensed chips to this list of
authorized buyers. 01
A restriction such as this one would likely evade the prohibition on post-
sale restrictions. Instead this is a pre-sale limitation on the scope of the right to
sell the patented product. If the licensee sells to an unlicensed buyer, then
there is no authorized first sale, and patent exhaustion is not triggered.
Such a provision should satisfy the patent holder's desire to license the
chipmaker but preserve the right to enforce its patents against particular
downstream customers. However, it is likely that this provision would be
unacceptable to many licensees. The licensee may have established
relationships with particular downstream purchasers. Or the licensee may have
potential customers it wants to target who are not authorized to purchase the
patented chips. Now the licensee finds that its business is hampered by a
licensing provision that shrinks its customer list. Such a licensing provision
could disrupt customer relationships, eliminate new business opportunities, and
severely hamper the licensee's business.
2. License Only Use or Manufacture, Not Sale
The patent holder may elect to license only the accused infringer's use or
manufacture of the patented products, but grant no right to sell the patented
products.102 As one commentator has observed, "[o]f course, if a licensee has
been granted the right to use and make, and not the right to sell, then there can
99. Andrew T. Dufresne, The Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects
ofthe Supreme Court 's Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I1, 37-38 (2009).
100. Id. at 37.
101. Id.
102. Id at 38.
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be no authorized sale."10 3  The court in Transcore recognized this as an
effective option to avoid exhaustion, observing that "TransCore did not, as it
could have, limit this authorization to, for example, 'making' or 'using."'1
The problem with this solution is that in the vast majority of cases, the
licensee will want a license to the patent for the express purpose of selling
patented products. Such a company derives no value from a license
authorizing it only to use or make the patented product.' 05 One real-world
situation where such a solution may be satisfactory to the licensee would be
where it seeks to use a patented research tool, but does not intend to resell it.' 06
Outside of such limited contexts, the solution does not appear particularly
viable for most licensees.
3. Placing Pre-Grant Restrictions on the Field of Use Subject to the
Authorized Sale
Rather than authorizing a sale and then purporting to place restrictions on
the rights of downstream purchasers, the patent holder could restrict the scope
of the fields of use for which sales are authorized. For example, such a
provision might provide that a "licensee is authorized to sell to parties who do
not incorporate the licensed products into cellular phones." 0 7
This provision would likely defeat the goals of both parties. If the
provision is to be acceptable to the defendant, it has to include within the
authorization the field of use of its customers. But this is very often the same
field of use that the patent holder wants to pursue in future licensing
negotiations and in litigation. Only in the potentially rare situation where these
two fields of use do not match could this be an acceptable solution.
4. Restricting Authorized Sales to Sales Overseas May No Longer Be
Effective to Avoid Exhaustion
Under current law, one of the requirements of patent exhaustion is that
the first, authorized sale, must occur in the United States.'os Accordingly, the
103. Tyler Thorp, Testing the Limits of Patent Exhaustion s "Authorized Sale" Requirement Using
Current High-Tech Licensing Practices, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1017, 1036 (2010); see also Rinehart, supra
note 77, at 495 ("When a licensee receives only the right to use the patented good, restricted or otherwise, the
good does not become the property of the licensee and patent exhaustion does not apply.").
104. Transcore v. Elec. Transaction Consultants, 563 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
105. See generally Patrick Hagan, Reach Through Royalties as a Workaround for Patent Exhaustion, 2
HASTINGS Sa. & TECH. L.J. 243 (2010) (discussing the use of "reach through royalties" to allow inventos to
benefit from later inventions building offtheir work).
106. Id
107. See, e.g., James W. Beard, The Limits of Licensing: Quanta v. LGE and the New Doctrine of
Simultaneous Exhaustion, 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 29 (2008) (explaining the benefits of a discrete sale in
controlling the potential selling power of a licensee); Richard P. Gilly & Mark S. Walker, Supreme Court's
Quanta Decision Clarifies the Reach ofPatent Exhaustion, 20 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. I , 4-5 (2008)
(detailing potential strategies to restrict sales); Dufresne, supra note 99, at 39 (discussing field-of-use
restrictions prohibiting licensees from selling patented sound amplification tubes to commercial users).
108. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reconfirming
that this is the law and was not overruled by Quanta in Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)).
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patent holder could avoid exhaustion by only authorizing the licensee to make
sales overseas.
Needless to say, this solution would only be acceptable for licensees who
intend to sell products exclusively overseas.
The viability of this solution has now been thrown into doubt by the
Supreme Court's recent holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that
authorized copies made overseas trigger copyright exhaustion.109 This holding
strictly applies only to copyright exhaustion.11o However, as the Federal
Circuit recently noted in Lifescan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, "[t]he
Supreme Court has frequently explained that copyright cases inform similar
cases under patent law.""' The Federal Circuit then relied on Kirtsaeng 's
discussion of the policy against the alienation of chattels to hold that the first
authorized gift of a patented article, without compensation, triggers patent
exhaustion. 2 It would therefore come as no surprise if the Federal Circuit
overruled its precedent in light of Kirtsaeng to hold that authorized sales
overseas of patented items triggers patent exhaustion. Such a ruling would
render this particular pre-sale restriction ineffective to avoid patent exhaustion.
Moreover, the parties should take care to ensure that the sales will not be
deemed as occurring in the United States. In another context, the Federal
Circuit has rejected formalistic mechanisms to establish that sales occurred
outside of the United States.1 3 In LiteCubes, a party argued that products were
sold outside of the United States because although they were sold and directly
shipped to customers in the United States, they were sold "freight on board" in
Canada, such that title to the goods passed in that country.114 The court held
that a "sale" can occur at "the location of the seller and the buyer and perhaps
the points along the shipment route in between, or . .. [at] the single point at
which some legally operative act took place, such as the place where the sales
transaction would be deemed to have occurred as a matter of commercial
law."' '1 Accordingly, to invoke the strategy of only authorizing sales outside
of the United States, the parties must be willing to ensure that the sale and the
purchase and the points along the shipment route truly occur outside of the
United States.
B. Additional Potential Solutions
1. The Unpracticed Patents Clause
Often at the conclusion of patent litigation, the plaintiff licenses to the
defendant an entire patent portfolio, including many patents that were not
asserted in the litigation. In large patent portfolios, there may be dozens or
109. Kirtsacng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
110. Id. at 1355-56.
111. LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1375 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
112. Id. at 1376.
113. Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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even hundreds of unasserted patents." 6  Accordingly, the plaintiff may be
particularly keen to establish that its right to assert the non-asserted patents
against downstream purchasers are not exhausted."17
One of the requirements of exhaustion is that the product subject to the
authorized sale must practice or substantially embody the patent. 118
Accordingly, the parties may attempt to insert a provision into their licensee
agreement recognizing that "there are patents covered by this license that the
defendant does not practice, and whose licensed products do not substantially
embody the claims thereof. Such patents are attached hereto as Appendix A."
The purpose of such a provision would be to attempt to defeat the "substantial
embodiment" prong of patent exhaustion rather than the "authorized sale"
119prong.
However, such a provision is likely ineffective to defeat patent exhaustion
in litigation. If the products do not practice or substantially embody the
unasserted patents, then the plaintiff will not be able to prove infringement of
those patents by virtue of downstream purchasers' use of the products.
Moreover, a court would not likely accept a lack of substantial embodiment
based merely on an assertion in a license agreement-such a finding would be
based on the objective technical evidence. At the very least, such a provision
breeds uncertainty, and should give the patent holder no comfort that its patent
rights will be preserved.
2. Reciting Alternative, Non-Infringing Uses for the Product is Unlikely an
Effective Solution
In Quanta, the Supreme Court held that the microprocessors at issue
substantially embodied LG's method claims, and therefore triggered
exhaustion, because the sole reasonable use of the microprocessors was to
practice the patented methods.' 20  Although the microprocessors did not
infringe until they were connected to a bus and memory as recited in the patent
claims, this was their only reasonable and intended use. 12 The Court ruled
that "the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item
applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent-even if it does not
completely practice the patent-such that its only and intended use is to be
finished under the terms of the patent."' 22
In light of this holding, Professors Richard P. Gilly and Mark S. Walker
116. See Michael Mechan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in the US. Patent
System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 112 ("[Tlhe majority of patents will never be
asserted.").
117. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 630 (2008) (explaining LGE's theory
that although Intel can sell a computer utilizing LGE's patents, any downstream purchasers of the system
could still be liable for patent infringement).
118. Id. at 638.
119. See Quanta, 564 U.S. at 634-35 (holding that the authorized sale of an item that substantially
embodies the patented invention results in patent exhaustion).
120. Id. at 630-35.
121. Id.at631.
122. Id. at 628.
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suggest that "patentees may wish to articulate in their licenses alternative
reasonable uses of the articles sold by licensees . . . . [T]he language
describing other uses would possibly defeat exhaustion and reduce the
likelihood of costly litigation . . "123
In light of recent developments in the Federal Circuit, this solution is
likely ineffective in many circumstances. In Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc.,
the court clarified that the existence of non-infringing uses for the patent only
prevents patent exhaustion in cases where the accused products do not practice,
but merely substantially embody, the asserted patents.124  In Quanta, for
example, the authorized first sale was of an unpatented apparatus-a
microprocessor-that could not practice the asserted method claims. "The
[Supreme] Court thus established that method claims are exhausted by an
authorized sale of an item that substantially embodies the method if the item
(1) has no reasonable noninfringing use and (2) includes all inventive aspects
of the claimed method." 2 5 But in Keurig the Federal Circuit held that this test
does not apply where the authorized sale is of a product that actually practices
the patent. In such cases, the existence of non-infringing uses does not
prevent patent exhaustion.' 27 Accordingly, reciting non-infringing uses for the
licensed products in the patent license cannot prevent exhaustion where the
products actually practice the asserted patent claims.
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit further clarified the narrow application
of the "non-infringing use" exception. In Lifescan the court held that even in a
case where the accused products are alleged only to substantially embody the
patents, the existence of non-infringing uses does not necessarily prevent
patent exhaustion.128 Rather, "alternative uses are relevant to the exhaustion
inquiry under Quanta only if they are both 'reasonable and intended' by the
patentee or its authorized licensee." 29 Accordingly, the strategy of reciting
non-infringing uses does not give the patent holder certainty that exhaustion
will not occur, because the court might disagree that the recited uses are
genuinely intended uses for the product. As Gilly and Wagner observe, "[i]t
may not be possible to describe alternative reasonable uses for certain articles,
such as microprocessors."' 30
Finally, acknowledging that there are non-infringing uses can be an
admission that defeats certain claims. For example, in order to prove
contributory infringement, the patent holder must show that the accused
component or apparatus has no substantial non-infringing use.' 3 ' For this
reason, this strategy would likely be unacceptable to the patent holder.
123. Gilly & Walker, supra note 107, at 6.
124. Keurig v. Sturm Foods, 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1374.
128. LifeScan Scot., Ltd. V. Shasta Techs., 734 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
129. Id. at 1369 (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. L.G. Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 631 (2008)).
130. Gilly & Walker, supra note 107, at 6.
131. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting the elements that
need to be proved to establish contributory infringement).
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3. Divided Royalties and Monitoring
If the patent holder seeks to be compensated for both the sale and
subsequent use of the patented product, dividing the royalty payments can be
an elegant way of achieving this result. In other words, the royalty payments
can simply be restructured so that the patentee is paid first upon the
manufacture of the patented product and again at the time of sale. The
licensee can pa both royalties, but pass the charge for the second royalty on to
the customer.
One commentator suggested that this arrangement might not be desirable
for certain patent holders because it requires the patent holder to monitor the
licensee's sales.134 Particularly when settling patent litigation, both parties
often want to wind up the dispute with a single payment, and not bother with
an ongoing running royalty.
IV. WHY PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CONTRACT AROUND
EXHAUSTION IN SETTLEMENT LICENSES
A. Allowing Parties to Contract Around Exhaustion to Settle Litigation Will
Result in Over-compensation for the Patent Holder
As the above analysis shows, even if Quanta resulted in a complete bar
on post-sale restrictions, it may be possible to contract around exhaustion in a
settlement license. But should parties be allowed to do so? Should the law
allow parties settling litigation to draft a provision that permits the patent
holder to pursue subsequent patent infringement litigation or licensing
demands against downstream purchasers of the accused technology? Or
should a categorical rule be applied whereby the granting of a settlement
license to conclude litigation completely exhausts the patent holder's patent
rights in the accused products, preventing the patent holder from pursuing
litigation and licenses against downstream purchasers?
The answer to this question must be grounded in an animating policy that
has always justified the exhaustion doctrine: the prevention of
overcompensation for patent holders (or "double-recovery" 35 ) for the use of
their patented technology. As the Court put the matter in Motion Picture
Patents Company, "this court has consistently held that the primary purpose of
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents,
but is 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts."" 36 The patent
holder should be rewarded for his original contribution to the art with a royalty
that is commensurate with the importance of his invention as determined by
the free market: "[i]f his discovery is an important one, his reward under such a
132. See Layne-Farrar, supra note 15, at 1167 (suggesting such an approach).
133. Id. at 1158.
134. Bechler, supra note 98, at 4.
135. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the exhaustion
doctrine seeks to prevent double recovery).
136. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
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construction of the law will be large, as experience has abundantly proved; and
if it be unimportant, he should not be permitted by legal devices to impose an
unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of it."' 37 Accordingly, the
exhaustion doctrine acts as a check to ensure that the patent holder is not over-
compensated for his contribution to the art: "[t]he test has been whether or not
there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the
patentee has received his reward for the use of the article."1 38
There is, therefore, general agreement that, as Anne Layne-Farrar
expresses it, "the license fees (or sales Price) received for protected property
should be the market determined value." If we are to allow patent holders to
contract around exhaustion in settling litigation, we must ensure that this does
not constitute the use of "legal devices" to recover more for the patented
invention than the free market would allow.
There is a persuasive argument that allowing patent holders to license at
multiple levels will not result in double recovery. Professor Herbert
Hovenkamp refers to the theory developed during the 1950s by "the Chicago
School writers" that "in any multi-stage distribution chain there is but a single
monopoly profit to be earned."' 4  Professor Hovenkamp employs a
hypothetical loosely based on the facts of Quanta to illustrate this theory:
[S]uppose the patentee sells a patented microprocessor to Alpha
Company, which places the chip on a memory circuit board and then
sells the board to Beta Company, which installs the board as a
component of a computer. The patentee might be able to collect a
$5 royalty from Alpha and use the license restriction to obtain an
additional $3 royalty from Beta. Alternatively, it could charge the
entire $8 markup to Alpha, who presumably would pass on the $3
charge in its transaction with Beta. But assuming the profit-
maximizing value of the royalties in this distribution chain is $8 for
a single monopolist, the patentee could not profitably charge an $8
royalty to Alpha plus the $3 royalty to Beta.
As Dr. Layne-Farrar expresses the argument, in a frictionless world, the
patent holder will not be able to "take advantage of the multiple licensing
points to increase the aggregate royalty rate," 42 because this will raise the
price of the licensed products and thereby reduce demand: "[t]hus, if a rights
holder has found the optimal royalty earnings in licensing one production
level, and then attempts to increase its profits by licensing another level, it will
instead find that the decrease in the units sold outweighs the increase in the
per-unit margin, and making the new higher 'price' less profitable." 43
Accordingly, "cost pass-through constrains the aggregate royalty payments the
137. Id. at 513.
138. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
139. Layne-Farrar, supra note 15, at 1152.
140. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.487,514-15 (2011).
141. Id. at 515.
142. Layne-Farrar, supra note 15, at 1158.
143. Id. at 1159.
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IPR [intellectual property rights] holder receives,"14 and "patent exhaustion
and prohibitions on licensing multiple levels of the production-use chain
cannot be motivated b the need for a mechanism to constrain the fees charged
by IPR holders ... ."
Dr. Layne-Farrar further argues that allowing patent holders to charge
licensing fees at multiple levels of production creates certain economic
efficiencies.146 For example, "when royalty base monitoring can be improved
by obtaining output reports from multiple production points or when sharing
the royalty burden across production levels reduces licensees' incentives to
underreport their relevant sales .... 147
There are, however, "market frictions and transaction costs" that prevent
total cost pass-through.148 For example, Dr. Layne-Farrar observes that there
may be "technological or institutional constraints [to] prevent wholesale prices
from fully adjusting to changes in the royalties[.]"l 49  She opines that
"realistically, component manufacturers facing pricing frictions will be able to
pass some, but not all, cost increases through to their customers."so
Dr. Layne-Farrar argues that even if frictions exist that prevent total cost
pass-through, there are constraints to prevent the patent holder from
overcharging for its intellectual property by charging excessive royalties at
multiple levels.' 5 ' For example, if the upstream manufacturer were unable to
pass excessive royalty burdens down the supply chain, "the patent holder
would still need to be mindful of a licensee's incentives to reduce its supply in
the components market." 52 The patent holder must also be mindful that the
component manufacturer may attempt "to work around the patent." 53 And
even if these constraints are insufficient to prevent the patent holder from
"increasing its aggregate royalty income by licensing multiple levels of
production levels," "as long as some pass-through to consumers is possible, the
downstream royalty would be set with end consumer demand in mind, just as
with single level licensing, because that is how the patent holder maximizes its
royalty revenues on the downstream layer of production."' 54 Accordingly,
"any additional royalty income above the single level amount is a firm-to-firm
transfer of profits from the upstream manufacturer to the patent holder;
consumers would not be harmed." 55
If this theory is correct, then the exhaustion doctrine is unnecessary to
prevent the evil of double recovery, because the free market will check the
144. Id. at 1166.
145. Id. at 1161.
146. Id. at 1155.
147. Id. at 1185.
148. Id. at 1162.
149. Id. atI 172.
150. Id. at 1172.
151. Id. at 1177-78.
152. Id. at 173.
153. Id.at1173.
154. Id. at 1173.
155. Id.at1173-74.
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patent holder's ability to recover in excess of the "monopoly profit"' 56 by
charging additional royalties at each stage of the distribution line. Rather, the
only thing the exhaustion doctrine achieves is to "require the patentee to obtain
the entire $8 royalty charge from Alpha." 5 7 This is a cause of concern for Dr.
Layne-Farrar, who, as discussed above, points out that allowing patent holders
to allocate their royalties along different levels of the production and
distribution chain often allows for efficiencies such as ease of monitoring. 5 8
Does this theory apply in the case of a license agreement brokered as part of a
settlement? Where license agreements are brokered to settle patent
infringement litigation, there is cause for considerable doubt that market forces
and cost pass-through will deter patent holders from imposing an excessive
aggregate royalty burden across multiple levels of production.
As an initial matter, when parties settle patent infringement litigation, the
settlement price is often intended to compensate the patent owner for past
alleged infringement, rather than a royalty on future sales.159 The settlement
price is often largely or wholly a royalty on sales of products that have already
occurred. Because these sales have already occurred, there is no opportunity
for the accused infringer to pass this royalty burden down the supply chain.
Because the burden is not passed down the supply chain, it does not raise the
price of the downstream products upon which the patent holder will seek to
collect additional royalties. There is, accordingly, no decrease in the demand
for licensed products to discipline the patent holder from charging an excessive
royalty across multiple levels of production-the products have already been
sold. The patent holder can obtain a royalty on the accused infringer's past
sales that fully (or excessively) compensates it for the use of its intellectual
property in the sold items. And, if the patent holder is able to contract around
patent exhaustion, there are no market forces to prevent the patent holder from
then pursuing downstream users of the accused items to extract additional
compensation. The result is double-recovery for the patent holder for the use
of its intellectual property.
Second, it is doubtful that a defendant settling patent litigation will
always have the incentive to charge an appropriate price for a contract clause
that preserves the ability of the patent holder to pursue downstream users.
Typically, parties who settle litigation arrive at the contours of a broad
agreement in principle before undertaking the work to draft an agreement.,so
At this stage, the key term the parties have agreed upon is the settlement price.
Only as the agreement is being drafted will the patent holder raise the issue of
patent exhaustion, and demand a clause purporting to frustrate patent
exhaustion and preserve the ability of the patent holder to license or litigate
156. Monopoly Profit Definition, OXFORD REFERENCE, www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780199237043.001.0001/acref-9780199237043-c-2029.
157. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 515.
158. Layne-Farrar, supra note 15, at 1185.
159. Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA
313, 316 (2008-2009) ("Retroactive settlement licenses grant the alleged infringer authorization for its past
use of the patent-at-issue in exchange for compensation to the patent holder.").
160. Kieff, supra note 78, at 319-320.
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against downstream users of the licensed products. Theoretically, the demand
for such a clause by a patent holder should reduce the settlement price in an
amount commensurate with the patent rights the patent holder is retaining in
the licensed products. In practice, however, the expense and risk of litigation,
the threat of injunctions, and the pressure to settle can weigh heavily on the
patent infringement defendant in its consideration of the effects of settlements
on downstream purchasers.' An accused infringer who has expended
substantial resources litigating a case over many years and has finally arrived
at a settlement figure, often has little incentive to disrupt the settlement by
demanding a reduction in the settlement price in response to a demand by the
plaintiff for a clause exposing third parties to potential future litigation. As
Professor F. Scott Kieff points out, "what is well-known by any attorney
involved in patent licensing, settlement negotiations around ongoing or
potential patent litigation, or mediation of a patent dispute, is that what the
potential infringer often wants is mere peace from future litigation risk (often
called 'freedom to operate')." 62
It may be, as Professor Kieff observes, that "the potential infringer has
sufficient ties to its customers or input-providers that it wants to buy freedom
for them as well." 63 In such a case, it may be that when the patent holder
demands a settlement clause that purports to contract around exhaustion, the
accused infringer will balk, or at least lower the settlement price appropriately
to take account of the rights the patent holder is retaining. But in many
circumstances, the defendant will not have a direct incentive to disrupt the
settlement in this manner. Often "the patentee and the potential infringer elect
to strike a contract that buys peace only for that potential infringer, at a much
lower price, leaving others to fend for themselves when and how they see
fit." 64 The patent holder can obtain full (or excessive) compensation for its
patents as well as a clause that allows it to seek additional recovery against
third parties. Unless the courts refuse to allow such contract clauses, the patent
holder has the opportunity for double recovery.
But what of the circumstance where the accused infringer does have a
close relationship with its downstream purchasers? In a rational world, the
accused infringer would recognize that a settlement clause that allows the
patent holder to pursue downstream purchasers will result in further,
downstream attacks on its products-that it could disrupt the relationship
between the defendant and its customers and result in higher prices and less
demand for its products. A rational defendant would refuse to agree to such a
clause or demand that the settlement price be reduced substantially in exchange
for such a clause.
However, the settlement of litigation is not characterized by rationality.165
161. Id at 319.
162. Id at 320.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Rachlinski, supra note 16, at 114 ("[C]urrent theories of litigation fail to account for the
possibility that litigants' decision making under risk and uncertainty may not comport with rational theories of
behavior, and they therefore fail to paint a complete portrait of litigation.").
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As Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski has demonstrated, "[c]urrent theories of
litigation fail to account for the possibility that litigants' decision-making
under risk and uncertainty may not comport with rational theories of
behavior."l66 Dr. Rachlinski observes that "[a]ll of the economic models of
suit and settlement depend on the assumption that litigants make choices
designed to provide them with the best outcomes . . .. Empirical studies of
human decision-making by cognitive psychologists suggest that it is unlikely
that the economic model accurately describes the behavior of litigants."l67
In particular, Dr. Rachlinski argues that the decisions plaintiffs and
defendants make in settling litigation is unduly influenced by how those
decisions are framed.168 Behavioral research indicates that "when people
choose among gains, they tend to make risk-averse choices, preferring sure
gains over larger but riskier gains."l 69 However, defendants settling litigation
do not choose among gains. Rather, "defendants choose between accepting a
sure loss by settling, and accepting an uncertain but potentially worse outcome
by litigating further." 70
And "when people choose among losses, they tend to make risk-seeking
choices, preferring riskier outcomes over sure losses."'71 Dr. Rachlinski's
research explains why defendants will often irrationally spend money
continuing to litigate a case beyond the point in time at which it would be
cheaper to settle.
But once a settlement figure is reached, and the plaintiff proposes a clause
to contract around exhaustion, the defendant faces a similar choice. The
defendant can refuse to accept such a clause, in which case it will certainly
raise the settlement price. Alternatively, the defendant can accept the clause,
and retain the current, agreed-upon settlement price. Accepting the clause
involves future risk, because defendants' customers may be sued. Defendant's
customer may lose that litigation and defendant may be required to indemnify
its customers. Other bad consequences risk occurring as well, such as
increased prices or disruption to customer relations. But Dr. Rachlinski's
research suggests that a defendant may accept that risk in exchange for the
lower certain loss now (the lower settlement price), rather than incur a higher
certain loss now (a higher settlement price) in exchange for mitigating the
risk.172 The potential litigation against downstream customers may be risky,
but defendant will prefer that risk over a larger certain loss, even if to do so is
economically irrational. The result is that even where a defendant has close
relationships with downstream purchasers, such that a clause avoiding
exhaustion exposes the defendant to risk in the future, the defendant will not
necessarily act rationally in resisting that clause or in properly monetizing it in
the settlement price. If the courts enforce such a clause, the patent holder can
166. Id.
167. Id. at 116.
168. Id at 124-25.
169. Id. at 119.
170. Id.at 118-19.
171. Id.atil9.
172. Id at 145.
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pursue downstream customers in future litigation, and there is a risk the patent
holder will achieve double recovery or overcompensation for its patent rights.
This argument is a working hypothesis. The application of cognitive
psychology to litigant behavior is a "relatively new field." 73  Behavioral
decision theory has been applied to various aspects of legal decision-making,
including the award of pain and suffering damages, the assessment of
punitive damages, 7 eyewitness investigations, 7 6 law-firm management, 77
and antitrust law. This is the first article to attempt to apply the theory in the
context of litigants drafting a license agreement to settle patent litigation.
However, the hypothesis serves the useful purpose of raising questions about
the assumption that serves as the premise of the law and economics analysis of
the exhaustion doctrine: that parties will act in an economically rational way in
licensing patents. Behavioral decision theory suggests that if the license is
brokered to settle litigation, that assumption is mistaken.
Moreover, information costs can prevent the market from checking
double-recovery. Professor Hovenkamp insightfully observes that post-sale
restrictions can result in downstream purchasers paying more than the market
justifies for licensed products "in a market in which license terms are difficult
to discover." 79 Professor Hovenkamp posits the following hypothetical:
Suppose that the patentee assesses the post-sale license requirement
in its initial transaction with Alpha but that subsequent Betas
purchasing from Alpha do not all have notice of the restriction.
They may pay Alpha too much because they find out only after the
transaction has been consummated that they also owe $3 to the
patentee. The fact that subsequent purchasers did not know about
the restriction is generally not a defense in a patent infringement
action. As a result, they will take more of the patentee's chip than
they would otherwise have purchased, or they may forego a rival's
chip that would have been a better choice had they known the true
cost of this patentee's chip. 80
Professor Hovenkamp argues that a firm exhaustion doctrine is an excessive
way of addressing the problem. 181 Rather, "this problem can be addressed by
making timely notice a condition of enforcement."' 82 In other words, patent
173. Idatil8n.16.
174. See generally Edward J. McCaffcry ct al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (applying behavioral decision theory to juries awarding pain
and suffering).
175. See generally Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) (applying behavioral decision theory to juries awarding punitive
damages).
176. Daniel L. Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2008).
177. Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Law Firm Leadership Decisions: Can You, Should You, Trust
Your Gut?, 10-9 LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP. 1 (2010).
178. Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (20 12).
179. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 516.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 519.
182. Id. at 517.
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holders should be required to give clear notice of the post-sale restrictions that
encumber licensed products before enforcing them against downstream
purchasers; but they should not have their patent rights completely exhausted.
This raises questions regarding the effectiveness, reliability, and costs of
notice. Notice of intellectual property rights has proven to be unreliable and
imposes inefficient external costs on parties seeking to put goods into
commerce. As Professor Mark R. Patterson has explained, "[n]otice .. . can
be false notice, and it is costly, if not impossible, for licensees to determine the
validity of the notice they receive."183 Hence, even if the notice is correct, the
downstream manufacturer must expend resources to ascertain its validity, an
unnecessary tax on commerce. Moreover, as Professor Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling points out, in the case of downstream manufacturers receiving
notice, the "remoteness between the parties also makes clarification or
negotiation of problematic terms unlikely." 8 4
Professor Hovenkamp perceives these same issues, observing that
"[u]nfortunately, IP rights and IP licenses have nothing approaching the rather
effective recordation and notice provision that apply to land title."' 85
Moreover, intellectual property licenses come in such varied, novel, and
complex varieties that even the most sophisticated in-house lawyer for a
downstream company may not be able to determine with reliability whether or
not the license permits her company to enter commerce (assuming she is given
access to the license).186 Finally, effective notice may solve the information
costs that prevent a market check on double recovery, but it does not
necessarily address other frictions that prevent total cost pass-through.
Given this state of affairs, only a clear prohibition on contracting around
exhaustion can alleviate the concern with the patent holder achieving excessive
compensation for its patent rights by pursuing litigation at multiple production
levels. If there is a clear rule against contracting around exhaustion, parties
settling litigation will set the license fee at a rate that gives the patent holder
full compensation up front, and the defendant can simply pass along this extra
cost to downstream purchasers. This will also tend to result in royalties that
more nearly approximate the value of the patented inventions, because with
one transaction, as opposed to multiple transactions, there is less of an impact
on the market price caused by the friction of negotiation costs and the
investigation of license rights. A total exhaustion rule thereby efficiently
avoids the costs of additional licensing negotiations or litigation against
downstream purchasers.
183. Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 149 (2012).
184. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEo. L.J. 885,935 (2008).
185. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 541-42.
186. On the evils of the varied and complex structures of intellectual property licensing agreements, see
Christina Mulligan, A Numerous Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 235 (2013).
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B. Public Policy Against Restraints on Alienation Counsel Against Allowing
Parties to Contract Around Exhaustion
But what if the above analysis is incorrect? What if the free market
checked only by the modem, flexible, antitrust regime is sufficient to prevent
overcompensation for patent holders who aggregate royalties at multiple levels
of the production and distribution chain? Some would conclude that absent
demonstrated anticompetitive effects or restrains on innovation, there remains
no justification for the exhaustion doctrine; it should be contracted around
freely. This was the conclusion of the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt:
Unless the [post-sale restriction] violates some other law or policy
(in the patent field, notably the misuse or antitrust law) private
parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale.
The appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt's restriction is
reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has
ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an
anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason. 87
Similarly, Professor Hovenkamp persuasively argues that post-sale
restrictions should only be unenforceable if they are anticompetitive (a concept
-188limited to lowering output or raising prices) or serve to restrain innovation.
Preventing anticompetitive effects, as that concept is defined by the
antitrust laws, and preventing restraints on innovation, have not been the only
justifications for the patent exhaustion doctrine articulated by the courts. As
the Supreme Court (in the copyright context) and the Federal Circuit (in the
patent context) have recently recognized, the exhaustion doctrine acts as an
important check against restraints on alienation.'89 In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he 'first sale' doctrine is a
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree." 90  In holding
that copyright exhaustion can be triggered by an authorized foreign
reproduction, the Court relied in part upon "the common law's refusal to
permit restraints on the alienation of chattels."l 9' The Court observed that
Lord Coke explained this policy as early as 1628:
[If] a man be possessed of... a horse, or of any other chattell ...
and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein upon condition that the
Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] is
voi[d], because his whole interest ... is out of him, so as he hath no
187. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fcd. Cir. 1992).
188. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 493 (arguing that the legal policy of exhaustion is incoherent
because "all restraints become unenforceable as a matter of IP infringement actions, whether or not they are
anticompetitive or serve to restrain innovation"), 506 (criticizing the Supreme Court because it "did not
connect a policy limiting restraints on alienation to lower output or higher prices"), 511 (criticizing the rule of
Quanta that post-sale restrictions are invalid because "the rule applies without any inquiry into either
competitive effects or innovative restraints").
189. See also Van Houweling, supra note 184, at 923 ("What the court in Mallinckrodt failed to
acknowledge is that, just as land recording does not solve every problem associated with land servitudes,
safeguarding competition through antitrust (and patent misuse) does not eliminate every problem associated
with chatel servitudes.").
190. Kinsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
I9I. Id.
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possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against Trade and Traffi[c], and
bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man: and it is within
the reason of our Author that it should ouster him of all power given
to him. 192
In Lifescan the Federal Circuit relied in part upon this same policy against
restraints on alienation to expand the patent exhaustion doctrine. 93 The court
held that giving away a patented product in exchange for no consideration can
trigger patent exhaustion.194 In so doing, the court discussed at length the
Supreme Court's reliance on the policy against restraints on alienation in the
Kirtsaeng case.195 The court concluded that if patent exhaustion is easily
evaded, "consumers' reasonable expectations regarding their private property
would be significantly eroded."' 96
Professor Hovenkamp points out that in the antitrust context, the Supreme
Court rejected reliance on the rule against restraints on alienation many years
ago, deciding that it reflected "'formalistic line drawing' rather than
'demonstrable economic effect."" 97 But the policy against servitudes running
with property has compelling policy justifications beyond the goals of the
antitrust laws as they are now liberally interpreted.
Principally, the rule against restraints on alienation promotes the free flow
of goods in commerce. A company that purchases semiconductor chips en
masse to install and redistribute in its computers should be able to do so
without enduring unnecessary external costs to investigate running servitudes.
Just as excessive taxes on the chips inhibit the efficient and inexpensive
distribution of the computers to consumers, a private servitude (in the form of
reserved patent rights) that runs with the chips exacts the same harmful costs.
The running restriction raises the price of chips for the manufacturer and, in
turn, raises the price of computers for consumers. This cost may be justified to
promote innovation in the first instance. But once the patent holder has
licensed the chips or authorized the first sale, it has received its reward, and
imposing a running servitude on the goods becomes an unwarranted restriction
on commerce.
Indeed, a private servitude that runs with licensed goods is more harmful
to society than an excessive tax, because the validity of a government imposed
tax is easy to ascertain. A patent restriction that runs with goods down the
chain of production and distribution may be invalid or unenforceable. The
computer manufacturer must commit resources to discovering and ascertaining
the validity of such a restriction. It may be that the computer manufacturer
must expend resources on litigation to resist an unwarranted restriction. Now
the bulk purchase of semiconductor chips is laden with inefficient external
costs.
192. Id. (quoting I E. Coke, Institutes ofthe Laws ofEngland § 360, p. 223 (1628)).
193. LifeScan Scotland, LTD v. Shasta Technologies, 734 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
194. Id. at 1376.
195. Id
196. Id. at 1377.
197. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 506.
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Professor Van Houweling has articulated compelling arguments as to why
intellectual property servitudes that run with personal property are harmful,
even in the absence of anticompetitive effects sufficient to result in antitrust
violations.198
First, personal property servitudes result in notice and information costs,
as noted above.199
Second, running servitudes can result in "underuse or inefficient use of
the resource subject to the restriction." 200 For example, if the chips at issue in
Quanta could only be used with Intel computers, as the license agreement in
that case required, then any chips in excess of those Intel needs will either
never be manufactured or never reach the computer maker who seeks to put
them to beneficial use-in this example, LG.
Third, running intellectual property servitudes on personal property can
effectively "waive public-regarding limitations built into intellectual property
law." 201 In the context of patent rights, Congress has struck the balance
between rewarding the patent holder for its innovation and allowing the public
to benefit from the disclosure and distribution of new technology.2 Once the
patent holder has received its market-determined reward by selling or licensing
the patented product, allowing patent holders to extract additional rewards
downstream through contract devices thwarts this balance and harms the
public.
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit now
recognize, antitrust concerns are not the only policies animating the exhaustion
doctrine. The policy against restraints on alienation likewise counsels in favor
of refusing to enforce settlement agreements that purport to contract around the
exhaustion doctrine. Once a patent holder releases its claims upon a product
and licenses its sale, allowing that patent holder to continue to pursue royalties
on the product downstream would "offend against the ordinary and usual
freedom of traffic in chattels." 203
C. A Prohibition on Contracting Around Exhaustion is Judicially Efficient.
In the litigation settlement context, contracting around exhaustion
imposes additional costs on society, even where the particular contractual
provision cannot be proven to create anti-competitive effects or impede
innovation. Allowing parties to settle a hard-fought patent infringement
lawsuit by contracting around patent exhaustion results in judicial inefficiency.
At first blush, this may appear counterintuitive. As noted above,
commentators have noted that the inability to contract around patent
exhaustion "may greatly frustrate the ability of commercial parties to strike
198. Van Houweling, supra note 184, at 932-50.
199. Id. at 932-39.
200. Id. at 939.
201. Id. at 946.
202. Id at 939.
203. LifeScan Scotland, LTD v. Shasta Technologies, 734 F.3d 1361, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907)).
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,,204deals over patents. This may seem to be an argument against prohibiting
parties settling patent litigation from contracting around exhaustion, because it
will make it more difficult to settle lawsuits, thereby burdening the courts.
However, a lawsuit that is settled by virtue of a license that avoids patent
exhaustion creates no judicial efficiencies. Although that particular lawsuit
will not go all the way to trial, many more lawsuits against downstream
purchasers of the licensed products would be facilitated.
In recent years, there has been a rise in such "customer suits," in which
patent holders "target the numerous resellers and end users of allegedly
infringing products rather than the accused products' original
manufacturers."205 Professor Brian J. Love and James C. Yoon have noted that
lawsuits against multiple downstream users of accused products are
206increasingly brought by non-practicing entities. In particular, these lawsuits
are brought by "a class of patentees that overwhelmingly acquire old,
extremely weak patents and assert them against the numerous unsophisticated
purchasers (rather than manufacturers) of allegedly infringing products in suits
that typically settle for less than defendants' anticipated litigation costs." 207
Love and Yoon argue that such "serial nuisance filings against resellers or
users quickly become more profitable than litigating on the merits against the
original manufacturer."208 The result is that non-practicing entities (NPEs) are
able to makes profits from the assertion of low-quality patents. Because
downstream purchasers have little incentive to defend against such litigation
on the merits, and because the cost of such defense far exceeds the cost of
settlement,209 customer lawsuits promote litigation outcomes that reflect only
the cost of defense, and fail to reflect the value of the asserted patents.210
These customer lawsuits result in tremendous judicial inefficiencies.
First, the practice results in more lawsuits involving numerous claims against
multiple defendants. "[B]ecause customers will generally find it rational to
settle with NPEs holding even incredibly weak patents. . . , NPEs will find it
profitable to sue as many judgment-proof customers as possible."21' Love and
Yoon observe that "NPEs in the business of purchasing patents for assertion
sue almost nineteen defendants per patent they litigate. This results in a
"flood of litigation that taxes the federal court system." 213
These customer lawsuits are moreover highly inefficient to adjudicate.
Because the downstream purchasers did not design the accused technology,
they do not possess the technical information to effectively defend against the
patents. It becomes necessary to conduct extensive third party discovery.
204. Kieff, supra note 78, at 316; see supra Section 11 (assessing the viability of seven potential
licensing solutions).
205. Love & Yoon, supra note 20, at 1605.
206. Id
207. Id. at 1609-1610.
208. Id. at 1613.
209. Id at 1622-1626.
210. Id. at 1615.
211. Id. at 1624.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Because the discovery involves sensitive technical information, party and
judicial resources are expended on confidentiality disputes, subpoenas,
motions practice, third party depositions, and other expensive burdens. As
Love and Yoon point out, it would be far more efficient if the patent holder
were to sue the manufacturer of the accused technology, who would have the
knowledge, information, and incentive to efficiently defend the lawsuit. 214
Moreover, requiring courts and litigants to assess post-sale restrictions on
a case-by-case basis undertaking a full-blown antitrust rule-of-reason
assessment imposes additional costs on the judicial system. Patent suits, which
are already complicated and expensive, would now become monstrous hybrids
of antitrust litigation in more and more cases. Many defendants would find it
more rational to settle than to fully litigate the validity of the post-sale
restriction under a rule-of-reason analysis, leaving the potentially anti-
competitive restriction unexamined by the courts.
A settlement agreement that purports to contract around exhaustion only
serves to facilitate lawsuits against multiple downstream purchasers. By virtue
of such settlement agreements, the patent holder seeks to preserve the ability to
pursue licenses and litigation down the stream of production. The courts
should not sanction a practice that results in the multiplication of litigation and
judicial inefficiencies.
D. Does Strengthening the Exhaustion Doctrine Deter Innovation?
Even if a post-sale restriction is not anti-competitive in the antitrust sense,
refusing to enforce it may be justified on the basis that it serves to restrain
innovation, the core evil that the Patent Act addresses.2 15 Professor
Hovenkamp's critique of the Quanta opinion is that "the [exhaustion] rule
applies without any inquiry into either competitive effects or innovative
restraint."216
Several commentators have argued that strengthening the exhaustion
doctrine will deter innovation.217 For example, LaFuze, Chen, and Burke
argue that if the courts fail to recognize "the conditional sale doctrine" (i.e., the
ability to contract around exhaustion), "the patent owner will respond to this
market condition by cutting back on research and development, thus slowing
the introduction of new technology into the industry." 218 To the extent patents
are weakened by the exhaustion doctrine, the argument goes, inventors will
decide not to make inventions or will not disclose their inventions to the public
through patent applications.2 19
Whether this assertion is true is very difficult to assess. Its adherents
have not undertaken the burden of proving with empirical evidence that
strengthening the exhaustion doctrine has discouraged inventors from
214. Id. at 1631-35.
215. Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 489.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. See, e.g., LaFuze et al., supra note 77, at 314.
218. Id. at 314.
219. Id.
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conducting their work. And it is very difficult to prove the negative - that
strengthening the exhaustion doctrine does not impede innovation.
A facile first attempt at proving the negative demonstrates the difficulty.
If we accept the proposition that innovation is measured by the number of
patent applications that are filed, is there empirical support for the notion that
the strengthening of the exhaustion doctrine deters innovation? The PTO
maintains data showing that the number of U.S. patent applications has steadily
220increased from 1840 to the present. Notably, the number of patent
applications filed continued to increase even in years when the Supreme Court
issued decisions strengthening the exhaustion doctrine.221 For example, in
1854, after the Court established the patent exhaustion doctrine in Bloomer v.
McQuewan, the number of patent applications rose to 3,328, nearly 25% more
222
applications than the 2,673 that were filed in 1853. In 1917, the Court ruled
in Motion Picture Patents Co. that post-sale restrictions are ineffective to avoid
patent exhaustion.223 Despite this ruling, the number of patent applications
rose from 67,590 in that year to 76,710 in 1919 and over 87,000 by 1921.224
And in the years since the Court strengthened the exhaustion doctrine
considerably in the 2008 Quanta case, the number of patent applications has
continued to rise, from 456,321 applications in 2008 to 542,815 applications in
2012.225
However, this analysis has deep flaws. Most critically, we do not know if
the number of patent applications would have risen even higher without the
burden of the exhaustion doctrine. Perhaps a carefully constructed survey of
inventors would answer the question of whether the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on exhaustion have an effect on their willingness to invent. A
survey of investors or venture capitalists might be even more probing: "Would
you invest less capital in innovation and patent prosecution if the resulting
patents could not be licensed at multiple levels of the production and
distribution chain?" Until such work is attempted, it is difficult to accept or
effectively refute the assertion that strengthening the exhaustion doctrine
discourages innovation.
Thus far, the discussion has been focused on the "reward theory" of
patent policy-that the Patent Act serves to encourage innovation directly by
rewarding inventors with a limited exclusionary right. A complementary
policy of the Patent Act is the "contract theory" of patents: that the
exclusionary right is granted to encourage the public disclosure of innovative
information, which indirectly encourages further innovation by those who
modify and improve the patented inventions and combine them with other
technology to make new innovations (after the patent in question has
220. See US. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present (2014), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ocip/taf/h counts.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (listing
data regarding patents since 1790).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Motion Picture Parents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917).
224. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 220.
225. Id.
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226
expired). Critical to this theory is the notion that the scope and length of the
exclusionary right must be carefully calibrated such that it is sufficiently robust
to encourage disclosure, but not so robust that it has the counterproductive
effect of impeding innovation by preventing others from building on the
innovative information.22 7
One way in which the exclusionary right must be calibrated is through
policing the doctrine of equivalents. In theory, the exclusionary right should
not be so enlarged through the doctrine of equivalents that it prevents the
creation of subject matter that is, in truth, a separate invention. Hence, "[t]he
theory of the doctrine of equivalents is that an applicant through the doctrine of
equivalents should only be able to protect the scope of his invention, not to
expand the protectable scope of the claimed invention to cover a new and
unclaimed invention. 228
Another way in which the exclusionary right is calibrated is through
Congress's determination of patent duration. "The optimal patent duration
should strike a balance between the incentive to induce disclosure and the aim
of limiting the monopoly distortion induced by patents."229
But patent exhaustion may also play a role in preserving room for
innovation because it limits the right of exclusion from being passed down the
chain of production and distribution. To the extent the right of exclusion
spreads through the chain of production to prohibit parties who are remote
from the patent holder from using a licensed product, it can inhibit such third
parties from innovating by combining the licensed product with their own
innovations.
Whether a strong exhaustion bar represents the appropriate balance to
indirectly encourage this type of innovation is again a very difficult (if not
impossible) empirical question to answer. But allowing patent holders to
freely contract around exhaustion without at least considering this question
poses a threat that the production of new downstream innovations will be
stifled by the very Patent Act that is supposed to encourage innovation. The
policies of contemporary antitrust law do not address these concerns. Nor
should patent law and policy be reduced to a superfluous shadow of antitrust
policy. Until such policies are considered, this author believes it is better to err
on the side of imposing a vigorous exhaustion doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The settlement of patent litigation often comes after years of expensive
litigation that has taxed the resources of the parties and the court. Once the
226. For an excellent analysis of the "contract theory" of patent policy, see Vincenzo Dcnicolb & Luigi
Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory ofPatents, 23 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 365 (2003).
227. Id at 366.
228. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). But see Siemens Medical Solutions, USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1269, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the claimed equivalent need not be an obvious variation of
the patented invention).
229. Denicolo & Franzoni, supra note 226, at 365.
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litigation has concluded in a settlement license and compensation for the patent
holder, the exhaustion doctrine provides useful repose from subsequent
litigation against downstream purchasers. Allowing parties to contract around
patent exhaustion in their settlement license breeds nothing but trouble for the
courts and for the purchasers of licensed products. Distributors and end-users
of licensed products have a reasonable and justified expectation that they may
use their purchased products for their intended purpose free of burdensome
litigation. Accordingly, the law should be clarified to establish that a litigation
settlement license completely exhausts the patent holder's rights in the licensed
products, regardless of whether the parties draft a licensing term that purports
to do otherwise. This should be so whether the parties to the litigation frame
the licensing term as a post-sale restriction, a pre-sale restriction, or something
else entirely.
